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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.'
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.
3
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND'
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
6
A CCEPTANCE.
Conditional.-An order was drawn by 0. on B., an attorney-at-law,
and was accepted by him in the following terms: "I will pay the
within amount out of the money collected on O.'s judgment against N.
as soon as the same is collected by me." B. was O.'s attorney. At
the time of acceptance 0. had recovered a verdict against N., which
was afterwards set aside, and in a new trial 0. recovered a much
smaller verdict, on which judgment was entered. This judgment was
collected by B. In an action by the payee of the order against B.:
Held, that B. was not liable on the acceptance: Rawson v. Beach, 18
R.I.
ACTION. See .Easenent.
ADMINISTRATOR.
Borrowing Money by Administrator-Rights of Lender-Ignorance
of Law.-An administrator has no legal power or right to borrow
money, and pledge the property of the estate in payment: .Merchants'
Nat. Bank v. Weeks, 53 Vt.
A bill brought against an administrator, not joining the heirs, or any
one interested in the estate, alleging that the orator loaned money to
the defendant, as administrator, and took his note therefor; that the
defendant has assets in his hands belonging to the estate sufficient to
pay the same; that he is personally poor and in bankruptcy; and pray-
ing for a writ of sequestration, to sequester the goods of the estate,
was held bad on demurrer, in that it presented no equity, and in that
the heirs or creditors were not made parties: Id.
And the result is the same, although the orator "supposed" at the
time the note was given, that the estate was held to pay it: Id.
If an administrator borrows money, he is personally liable; but
whether it is to be repaid from the estate, is a question for the Probate
Court, on the settlement of his account: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Irregular Endorsement-Guaranty.-To hold a third party who
irregularly endorses a promissory note, as joint maker, he must have
I From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 99 Illinois Reports.
2 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 52 Maryland Reports.
a From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 14 of his Reports.
4 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 13 Rhode Island Reports.
6 From Edwin F. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Vermont Reports.
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participated in the creation of the note or shared in the consideration
for which it was given: Hayden v. Weldon, .14 Vroom.
Endorsing the note before the payee imports only the contract of
second endorsee: Id.
Where the undertaking of a third party is to further secure the pay-
ment of a debt already created between the regular parties to the note,
it is a collateral contract, within the Statute of Frauds, requiring a
writing to prove, and a consideration to support it: Id.
Such an endorsement is not in itself authority to the holder of the
note to write over it a contract of guaranty: Id.
A guaranty is not negotiable, nor does it become so by being endorsed
upon negotiable paper, the payment of which it is designed to secure:
.d.
Joint Maker or E ndorser.-A. made a promissory note, payable on
demand with interest, to the order of B. It was endorsed by B., and
then by C.; B. and C. affixing their names for the accommodation of
A., and to enable A. to borrow money from the plaintiff, on the note.
Held, that C. was liable as an endorser, not as a joint maker, and was
entitled to due notice of dishonor. Held, further, that C's liability
was not varied by the fact that the note was payable on demand with
interest: Sawyer v. Brownell et aL, 13 R. I.
BOND.
Bond given after Office has been Assumed-Bond must be Sealed
when Signed, or some one Authorized by the Sureties to Seal-Date-
Parol Evidence-The bond of a town treasurer, given for the faithful
performance of his official duty, not executed till near the close of his
term, but ante-dated, binds his sureties to respond in damages for all
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, during the year for which he was
elected: Town of Barnet v. Abbott, 53 Vt.
The treasurer had appropriated the town's money to his own use;
but the default occurred prior to his last election, and in fact not during
the time covered by the bond. Held, in an action on the bond, that
the sureties are not liable: Id.
When the bond was delivered to the selectmen by the treasurer, it
was signed and sealed; but when it was executed it was not sealed, and
the sureties never sealed it, and never authorized any one to affix a seal
to it. Held, defectively executed: Id.
Parol evidence is admissible to prove that a bond was ante-dated;
that it was not sealed at the time of signing; and that the sureties
never authorized any one to seal it- Id.
CERTIORARI.
At Common Law-When it will Lie.-There are two classes of cases
in which a common-law certiorari will lie - first, where it is shown that
the inferior court or jurisdiction has exceeded its jurisdiction; and,
second, where it is shown that the inferior court or jurisdiction has
proceeded illegally, and no appeal or writ of error will lie: Hjyslop v.
Pinch, 99 Ills.
The common-law writ of certiorari simply brings before the court,
for inspection, the record of the inferior tribunal or body, and its judg-
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. 699
ment affects the validity of the record alone-that is, determines that
it is valid or invalid: Id.
It being within the discretion of the court to grant or refuse the
writ, extrinsic evidence to the record may be received to show that no
injustice has been done; that if the proceedings shall be quashed the
parties cannot be placed in statu quo, or that for any good reason the
writ ought not to be granted. If such evidence is given by the re-
spondent, the petitioner will have the right to rebut it. But when the
record is before the court on the return of the writ, the court will look
only at the record: Id.
Mere lapse of time, short of the limitation for prosecuting a writ of
error, will not bar the issuing of the common-law certiorari; and in
order that it may be barred by laches, it must appear that since the
making of the record sought to be reviewed, and upon its assumed
validity, something has been done so that great public detriment 
or
inconvenience might result from declaring it invalid - 1d.
CONTRACT
For Personal Service-Hiring by the Weele.-Where one is hired to
work by the week, and is receiving wages weekly, the burthen of proof
is upon him to show a change in the contract of hiring, as to term of
service: State, Stanford, Prosecutor, v. Varnish Co., 14 Vroom.
CORPORATION. See Surety
COSTS.
Liability of Assignee suing in name of Assignor for.-An assignee,
beneficially interested, suing in the name of his assignor, and failing in
the action, is liable to defendant for costs: Davenport, for the use
of Irwin, v. Elizabeth, 14 Vroom.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Evidence-Almanac.-In a trial for murder, the state offered in evi-
dence "an almanac for 1879," for the purpose of proving at what hour
the moon rose on the night of August 9th 1879. Held, that the evi-
dence was admissible, though there was no proof of the character of
the almanac, and though the time indicated by it for the moon's rise
was a prediction and not the declaration of a fact that had taken place
when the almanac was published: Munshower v. The State, 55 Nd.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Power.
DOWER. See Husband and Wife.
EASEMENT.
Cannot be created by Parol-Assumpsit.-An easement cannot be
created by parol: Banghart v. Fummerfelt, 14 Vroom.
The declaration in assumpsit alleged that defendant made a parol
unwritten agreement with a former owner of plaintiff's mill, to erect on
his own land a dam and make a certain aqueduct, and to keep up, per-
petually, the same, assigning as a breach the not keeping up such dam.
Held, that an action at law wonld not lie on such a contract: Id.
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ESTOPPEL. See Vendor and Purchaser.
By Acgutescence and Ats.-A person who acts as secretary and treas-
urer of the trustees of schools of a township for eleven years, thereby
sanctioning the validity of their acts, and who contracts to convey them
a parcel of land for a school site, will be estopped from denying the
legality of the election of such trustees, although the roll-books of the
election may be lost: Frick v. Trustees of Schools, 99 Ills.
A person who has held office under a board of school trustees for
several years, and who has held it out to the public as a legally consti-
tuted body, cannot avoid his contract with such board by setting up
that it had no legal existence : Id.
GUARANTY. See Bils and Notes.
HIGHWAY. See Negliyence.
HOMESTEAD.
Ante-nuptial Contract-SpeiYfic Performance-Release of Homestead.
-The plaintiff and the iptestate entered into an ante-nuptial agreement,
in writing and under seal, by which she released all right to dower and
homestead in his estate, in consideration of marriage, and the payment
of $50 per year during his natural life, if she outlived him, but $50
per year during her natural life, if he outlived her, They were subse-
quently married; but it did not appear that the husband performed his
part of the contract as to paying. Held, that the homestead, by force
of the statute vests in the widow, on the death of the husband; and
the contract, being a release or a discharge of something not in exist-
ence at the time it was given, cannot defeat this right : Mann v. Mann's
Estate, 53 Vt.
The ante-nuptial covenant, not to claim a homestead, was executory,
and could only be enforced by a court of general equity powers: Id.
The estate is in no condition, as presented by the agreed case, to ask
a court of equity to restrain the plaintiff from claiming a homestead;
since, there, if a party seeks the enforcement of the specific performance
of a contract, he must be able to assert and establish, that he has per-
formed on his part: Id.
Ante-nuptial and post-nuptial contracts are peculiarly subjects of
equity jurisdiction and cognisance : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Inchoate Right of Dower-Allowance to Wife in consideration of
having united with her Husband in a Deed of Trust and Mortgage.-
The interest of the wife in her husband's real estate is inchoate only
during his life. It requires the husband s death to occur before it
becomes a vested right. The wife's inchoate right is not such a right
as may be bargained and sold. Her deed does not pass any title. It
operates only by way of estoppel or release, and any words of release
would be as effectual as words of grant. She cannot convey it to a
stranger. It is only released to the owner of the fee. There is no scale
or standard for ascertaining the present worth of a wife's inchoate right
of dower: Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md.
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A deed from H. in which his wife united, conveyed all his property
to trustees for the benefit of his creditors. The deed provided for the
payment to the wife, in consideration of her uniting in the deed, of one-
twelfth of the gross proceeds of the sale of the real estate thereby con-
veyed in trust, in lieu of her contingent right of dower therein. The
wife had previously united with 11. in several mortgages of hi real
estate, one of them being to the same parties afterwards trustees in the
deed of trust; there was, however, one piece of land not mortgaged
which passed by the deed of trust. The grantees in the deed sold the
property as therein provided. In the distribution of the proceeds of the
real estate, it was Held:
1. That though the wife could not bind I's creditors (except such
as were parties to the agreement), to pay her from his estate, for her
contingent right of dower, just such sum as she might have stipulated
with H. and his trustees should be paid for uniting in the deed, and
which was accordingly reserved therein ; nevertheless, considering that
the wife had barred herself in the larger part of the estate by uniting
in the mortgages, and had united in the deed of trust, in the expecta-
tion of receiving an allowance from the whole estate, it was equitable
she should receive the twelfth part of the proceeds of sale of the piece
of land not mortgaged, xfter paying its proportion of the costs of the
case, as an allowance to her for her release of expectant right of dower
in that parcel:
2. That the wife should also be allowed the twelfth part of the sum
awarded to the mortgage of the trustees, they being bound by the agree-
ment contained in the deed of trust: Id.
JOINT TORTFEASORS. See Negligence.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Liability of Tenant holding over.-Where a tenant for a year or years
holds over after the expiration of his lease, without having made any
new arrangement with his landlord under which such holding over
takes place, the landlord, at his election, may treat the tenant as a tres-
passer, or as a tenant for another year, upon the same terms as in the
original lease, and this though the tenant has no intention of holding
over for a year, or of paying the same rent. The law fixes the tenant's
liability for holding over, independent of his intention. The legal pre-
sumption of a renewal from the holding over, cannot be rebutted by
proof of a contrary intention on the part of the tenant alone : Clinton
Wire Cloth v. Gardner, 99 Ills.
LIBEL.
Construction of Words.-On demurrer to a declaration for libel, the
words must be construed in the sense imputed to them by the plaintiff;
Peder v. Herrick, 14 Vroom.
Words having a tendency to bring a person into ridicule hatred or
contempt, are actionable if written or published: Id.
Caution against imputing in the pleading a meaning to words which
the facts will not sustain : Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Joint Contractors-Procuring Paymnent to be made.-It is not neces-
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sary that the payment should be made from tho funds of the party
making it, to arrest the running of the statute; it is sufficient if he
procures it to be done: McConnell v. Merrill, 53 Vt.
Where the surety procures a payment to be made, though out of the
funds of the principal, and promises to pay the balance of the note, such,
in effect, is payment by the surety himself: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Office-Ordinance.-An appointment to, and acceptance of, a munici
pal office, does not constitute silch a contract as will obstruct a vacation
of the office: Inhabitants of Burlington v. Estlow, 14 Vroom.
An ordinance which occupies the entire field of a former one, will, as
a general rule, repeal such former one by implication: Id.
Trespass by .Highway Commissioners-Ultra Vlres-Ratification.-
The highway commissioners of the city of Providence, without the
direction of the city council, made excavations on a private way. The
cost of the work was paid by the city in the usual routine of payment
for work done by the commissioners. In an action by the owner of the
way against the city: Held, that under the ordinances of the city, the
acts of the commissioners in excavating and of the financial officers of
the city in paying for the work were all ultra vires : Pierce v. Tripp,
13 R. I.
Held, further, that the city, not having ratified these acts, was not
liable: Id.
What Property to be taken in Payment of its Debts-In general, the
Taxing Power is the only means of Payment.-The private property of
individuals within the limits of a municipal corporation cannot be sub-
jected to the payment of its debts except by taxation: Lyon v. Eliza-
beth, 14 Vroom.
Property used by such corporation in the exercise of its functions of
government, cannot be taken in execution upon a judgment against the
corporate body: Id.
The taxing power ordinarily furnishes the only means a public cor-
poration possesses for raising the revenues necessary to discharge its
obligations: Id.
The creditor may establish his claim by judgment, and it then be-
comes the duty of the proper officers to provide the means of pay-
ment out of the public revenues, which duty is enforceable by manda-
mus: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Highway-Oyfect calculated to frighten H orses.-If an object calcu-
lated to frighten horses is left in a highway, and after reasonable notice
negligently permitted to remain there by the town charged with the
repair of the highway, such town is in Rhode Island liable for the
injury sustained by a traveller whose horse is actually terrified by such
object and runs away: Bennett et ux. v. F7.field, Town Treasurer, 13
R.I.
A. left such an object in a highway; B.'s horse was frightened by
it; B. sued A. for the injury caused by the nuisance, recovered judg-
ment, and committed A. on execution. A. was discharged under the
United States Bankrupt Act; B. then sued the town. Held, that A
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and the town were not joint tort-feasors, A. being liable at common law
the towu for the neglect of a statutory duty : Id.
Held, further, that A. and the town were liable for distinct though
related torts resulting in the same injury: id.
Held, further, that B.'s action against the town could be sustained:
Id.
OFFICE. See Municipal Corporatiow.
ORDINANCE. See Municipal Corporation.
POWER.
.Exercise of, not enforced for benefit of Creditors.-Courts 'f equity
will not aid creditors of a donee of a power, where there is a non-exe-
cution of the power, by compelling him to execute the same in his own
favor. But where there has been a defective execution, the court will
supply the defective execution in favor of a purchaser, creditor, wife or
child: Gilman-v. _Bell, 99 Ills.
No title or interest in the thing vests in the donee of a power until
he exercises the power. It is virtually an offer to him of the estate or
fund,-that he may receive or reject at will, and like any other offer to
donate-property toa person, no title can vest until he accepts the offer,
nor can a court of equity compel him to accept the property offered,
against his wish, even for the benefit of creditors : Id.
SURETY. See Bond; Limitations, Statute of.
For Treasurer of Corporation-Liability of-Damages.-Where the
office of treasurer of a corporation is annual or limited, the sureties on
his official bond will not be liable for a breach of the duties of such
officer beyond the definite term, when the condition is for good behavior
during his continuance in office ; but if there be added thereto "whether
of the present term for which he has been elected, or of any succeeding
terms to or for which he may be elected," their liability continues:
.People's Building & Loan Association v.. Vroth, 14 Vroom.
The monthly dues and fines of a building and loan association being
payable in cash, the presence and acquiescence of the executive officers
when promises to pay are given by members, or others for them, and
accepted by the treasurer, will not discharge sureties on his official
bond, from liability for credit thus given, and loss: Id.
The unauthorized acts or laches of one agent of a corporation cannot
annul its rules relating to the duties of another agent, nor discharge
him or his sureties from liability for a breach of its regulations: Rd.
Where fines and dues are not actually received by the treasurer, the
damage sustained thereby is the rule for making the assessment: Id.
TORT.
For breach of Statutory Duty.-In case, for the neglect of a statutory
duty, the plaintiff must show that the duty was imposed for his benefit
or existed for his security from the injury suffered: Smith v. TrHPp,
13 R. I.
TREsPAss.
T-espass on a Burial Lot-Punitive Damages.-An action of tres-
pass guare clausumfregit can be maintained for breaking and entering
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a burial lot; the trespass complained of being the digging a grave in
the lot and burying therein the corpse of a child without the consent
of the plaintiff, who had acquired the privilege and right to make inter.
ments in the lot to the exclusion of others, so long as the ground be-
longing to a society of which the plaintiff was a member (in which ground
was the lot purchased by the plaintiff), remained a cemetery: Smith
v. 77tompson, 55 Md.
There being evidence before the jury from which they could find that
the defendant was actuated by malice in committing the trespass, the
plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages: Id.
USURY.
Contract, so far as void for, cannot be cured by subseguent Leqisla-
tion.-A contract made in 1856, so far as it provided for the payment
of interest in excess of that allowed by law, was absolutely void, and
could not be rendered valid and binding by any subsequent repeal of
the law governing when it was entered into, but such contract as to the
principal and such rate of interest as was allowed by law, at the time
of its execution, to be contracted for, was not void : Woolley v. Alex-
ander, 99 Ills.
A penalty for reserving usurious interest in a contract, until enforced,
is subject to legislative control, and may be abolished wholly or in part:
Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Waiver of Lien-Estoppel.-One may waive by parol a lien on lum-
ber reserved in a conditional deed, to secure the purchase price of the
land on which the lumber was cut: Stone v. Fairbanks, 53 Vt.
If he does so waive it, he is estopped from setting up title to the lum-
ber against a third party purchasing of the plaintiff, who had bid it off
at a sheriff's sale to satisfy his debt against the grantee for cutting: Id.
The facts-that the lien-holder saw the plaintiff cutting the timber;
that he made no objection to it; and that the evidence tended to show
that he knew he was cutting on some contract with the grantee, tended
to prove a waiver, and should have been submitted to the jury: Id.
WAIVER. See Vendor and Purchaser.
WILL.
Apportionment of an Annuity charged on Real Estate.-An annuity
having been charged by will on several parcels of real estate devised to
one person, the right of the annuitant to enforce the charge against any
or all of the property devised, can be waived only by agreement on the
part of the annuitant, and is in no manner affected by deeds, mortgages
or transactions to which the annuitant was not a party: Perkins v.
Emory, 55 Md.
